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192 MIRAMAR Co. V. CITY OF SANTA BARBARA [23 C.2d 
dinance, which is no broader than the statute, is likewise not 
applicable. 
I am unable to follow the argument of Mr. Justice Shenk 
in his concurring opinion in this case. He concedes that the 
claim statute upon which defendant relies applies only to a 
damage resulting from a dangerous and defective condition 
of public property. He does not say that the breakwater in 
question is dangerous or defective; in fact, he cannot fairly 
say so, because there is no allegation or finding to that effect. 
Such being the case there is no basis whatever for his con-
clusion that the claim statute is applicable and that plain-
tiff's action is barred for its failure to file a claim. 
Mr. Justice Shenk states: "The general liability having 
thus been provided for may not be relegated to the field of 
tort liability alone by the addition in the statute of the words 
'after such accident has occurred.' The quoted words refer 
to the time when the claim must be filed, and do not limit 
established general liability. The foregoing cited cases like-
wise establish that damage is caused by the dangerous or de-
fective condition of public works, within the meaning of the 
statute, if the condition of the public works is dangerous 
to tbe plaintiff's property without reference to negligence." 
(Emphasis added.) That conclusion is clearly erroneous. 
'1'he claim statute is clearly related to and contemplates only 
those liabilities created by the 1923 Public Liability Act 
(Stats. 1923, p. 675; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 5619) 
or for liability arising out of a proprietary function. (Helbach 
v. Oity of Long Beach, 50 Cal.App.2d 242, 244 [123 P.2d 
62] ). The wording of the two acts is identical. In the 1923 
act li~bility is imposed for "injuries to persons and property 
resultmg from the dangerous or defective condition" of pub-
lic works. It was said in Johnson v. Oity of Glendale, 12 
Cal.App.2d 389, 393 [55 P.2d 580]: "'%e act of 1931 in 
so far as it requires the presentation of claims within ni~ety 
days after the happening of an accident, merely prescribes 
rules of procedure for the enforcement of claims arising 
under the 1923 act, no such rules having been prescribed by 
that act." (Emphasis added.) The liability under the 1923 
. act does not exist unless the agency has notice of the danger-
ous or defective condition. The liability is imposed solely 
for negligence. If the 1931 claim act applies to inverse 
condemnation cases where no notice is necessary but still 
calls those conditions dangerous or defective, then there is 
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liability for a dangerous or defective condition regardless .of 
whether the agency has notice. The gravaman of the lIa-
bility referred to in the claim statute is negligence. (See 
9 Cal.Jur. Ten-year Supp., Public Officers, secs. 178-189.) 
The judgment should be reversed. 
Curtis, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied Decem-
ber 2, 1943. Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for 
a rehearing. 
[L. A. No. 18066. In Bank. Nov. 4, 1943.J 
NATURAL SODA PRODUCTS COMPANY (a Corpora-
tion), Respondent, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., 
Appellants. 
(Two Cases.) 
[1] Waters-User of Water Rights-Ohange in Mode-Effect of 
Long Oontinuance.-0ne who makes substantial expenditures 
in reliance on long-continued diversion of water by another 
has a right to have the diversion continued if his investment 
would be otherwise destroyed. 
[2] ld.-User of Water Rights-Ohange mMode-Effect ofLon~ 
Continuance.-The rights of those who. improve land pre~l­
ously submerged are infringed if the land is,. submerged agam. 
[8] Id.-Procedure-Evidence-Su:ffi.ciency..L.LilLbUity·~ fo~,' Flo?d- . 
ing of Lake Bed.-In an action for .dam~ges,for t~e~oo~l.ng 
of a lake bed by the waters, of a rlver,defe~dant s)labihty 
was sufficiently established by findings that defendant mot orily 
diverted the flow of the river for many. years .but augmented 
it by activities which made the diversion ,appear .to be. perma-
nent, and that an outlet for the waters discharged might eas?y 
have been found or that they could have bee~ .temporanly 
stored in available space. 
. McK. Dig. References: [1,2] Waters, § 262; [3] 'Waters, §122; 
[4] Waters, §l76; [5] Waters, § 41; [6] Dam~~8; § 24j [7]~am­
ages, § 27j [8] Damages, § 70; [9-12] MUnlClpal Corpora~lOns, 
§ 453; [13,15] Municipal Corporations, § 453 (2); [14] Emment 
Domain, § 44; [16] Waters, § 713. 
.. c.2d-' 
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{4] Id.-Appropriation-Extent of Right-Beneficial Use-Dispo-
sition of Su~plus.-Const., art. XIV, § 3, and Civ. Code, § 1411 
do not re~Ulre .a. particular disposition of surplus water, least 
of all a dlSposltIOn harmful to the recipient. 
[5] Id.-Ripar~an Right~Extent-As Usufructuary.-A riparian 
own~r makmg no clalm to any beueficial use for the water has 
no flght to the full Bow of a river past his lands. 
[6] Damages-Loss of Prollts.-An award of damages for loss of 
pr~fits ?epends upon whether there is a satisfactory basis fer 
estImatmg what the probable earnings would have been had 
there been no tort. . 
[7] Id.-.Prospective Profits.-In an action for damages for the 
fioodmg of a lake bed by the waters of a river an award of 
prospe?tive profits .was not improper although,' in the years 
lmmedlately precedmg the fiooding, plaintiff' company did not 
make a profit from its operations in the lake bed, where it was 
engaged for t~e t-~o ye~rs preceding the tort in converting its 
plant but mamtamed Its sales position by selling products 
purchased elsewhere, and where the completion of the altera-
tions enabled plaintiff' to sell products from its own plant. 
[8] Id. - Measure-Injuries to Property-Real Property.-While 
the usual ~ethod for determining damages for trespass to real 
property IS on the basis of opinion evidence concerning the 
v~lue of the pro~erty before and after the tort, such method 
Y.lelds. to others If they are more appropriate to a particular 
SituatIOn. 
[9] MuniCipal Oorporations - Olainls - Presentment-To Whom 
Presented.-The board of water commissioners is the proper 
board to which a claim should be presented for the flooding of 
J. lak? bed by a dam operated as a part of the water works of 
the CIty of Los Angeles. (Charter of City of Los Angeles § 363.) . , 
[10] I~.-Olaims-Prese~tment-To Whom Presented.-The re-
qUIrement that a claIm be presented to a municipal board is 
satisfied by presentation to a subordinate who represents the 
board for the receipt of such claims from the pUblic. 
[11] Id.-Olainls-Presentment-To·Whom Presented.-The mem-
bers of a munic.ip~l water department may represent the board 
of water commISSIOners in receiving claims. 
[12] Id.-Olaims-Presentment-Method._A claim against a city 
may be presented by registered mail. 
(BJ See 15 Am.Jur. 514. 
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[18] Id. - Olaims-Presentment-Time for.,-The· tlu'rpose' 'that 
claims be filed in order to provide the city with ~ullinforma:.; 
tion concerning rights asserted against it is best served if the 
entire sequence of events giving rise to the injury is regarded, 
as the "occurrence from which the damage arose." (Charter' 
of the City of Los Angeles, § 363.) 
[14] Eminent Domain - Oompensation-Ordinances-Validit}r.-·· 
A municipality cannot enact legislation that would prevent ~ 
unduly hamper the enforcement of the right to compensation, 
for the damaging of property for public use. 
[15] MuniCipal Oorporations-Ola.ims-Presentment-Time ·for.-
. In an action for damages for the flooding of a lake bed bya . 
municipality, plaintiff' was not required to presE)nt a claim. 
within 90 days after the injury, where the damage arose, not 
from the dangerous condition of public property, b~t from 
the municipality's own acts. (Stats. 1931, p.2475;Deering's . 
", Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 5149.) 
[16] Waters-Procedure-Limitations.-In nn action for damages' 
for the flooding of a lnke bed by tho waters of Il. river, pl:tin- ' 
tiff's recovery could not be defen.tcd by Code Civ. Proc., §§ 315, 
316, 320, 338(2), 339(1), and 343, wher~ §~ 315, 316, and 320 
were inapplicable, and where the nction wns brou~htwithin 
the period prescribed by §§ 338(2), 339(1), and 343. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Inyo 
County. Wm. D. Dehy, Judge. Affirmed. 
Consolidated actions for injunction against, and for dam-
ages caused by, flooding of a lake bed by waters of a river. 
Judgment for damages for plaintiff affirmed. 
Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney, S. B. Robinson, Chief AB-
sistant City Attorney, Samuel Poorman, Jr., Assistant City 
Attorney, Robt. E. Moore, Jr., and Rex B. Goodcell,' .Jr., Dep-
uties City Attorney, and A. E. Chandler for Appellants. 
Kenneth Ferguson and Jess G.' Sutliff for Respondent.' 
Earl Warren, Attorney General, Robert W. Kenny, Attor~ 
ney General, Everett W. Mattoon, ABslstant Attorney Gen. 
eral, and Gilbert F. Nelson and Burdette J. Daniels, Depu. 
ties Attorney General, as Amici Curiae on Behalf of Respon-
dent. 
(14] See 5 Oal.Jur. 7BO; 34 Am.Jur. 32. 
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TRAYNOR, J.-In 1913, the defendant city of Los An-
geles completed its aqueduct to the Owens River Valley and, 
from 1919 to 1937, diverted into it virtually all the flow of 
the Owens River, which formerly emptied into Owens Lake, 
a body of salt water without outlet. As a result the lake 
dried up and its subsurface became a' crystalline cake impreg-
nated with brines containing valuable chemicals. On the. 
shores of the dry lake plaintiff had two plants to which brines 
pumped from wells on the bed of the lake were piped for the 
production of soda products. Plaintiff acquired the older of 
the two plants in 1932, when it leased mineral rights in the 
lake from the State of California. Plaintiff subsequently ex-
tended its pipe lines several miles farther along the bed of 
the lake, drilled wells, and installed pumps and brine heat-
ers, acquiring the necessary leases and rights of way from 
the state. The brines thus made available were of higher al-
kalinity and therefore of greater value than those previously 
obtained. To improve its efficiency in extracting chemicals 
from the brines so as to increase production, plaintiff built 
a new plant and adopted a new process. 
Plaintiff's operations were possible because of the dehy-
drated state of the lake bed, the continuation of which de-
pended on the absence of any substantial flow of water from 
Owens River into the lake. The extent of the flow was deter-
mined by the manner in which defendant operated its aque-
duct. Its dam across Owens Valley, forming Tinnemaha Res-
ervoir, served to regulate the flow of the river. Below the 
dam, the water, which flowed through its natural channel 
until it reached Intake, could be directed into the aqueduct 
proper by means of defendant's diversion dam, or into Owens 
Lake if the gates in the dam were opened. 
On February 6, 1937, before plaintiff's new plant could be 
put into operation, defendant opened the gates at Intake 
thereby causing a large amount of water to flow into the lake: 
Defendant continued to direct the water into the lake inter-
mittently until July 1, 1937, and the surface of the lake be-
came flooded to a depth of three or four feet. The water in-
undated much of plaintiff's plant, causing substantial physi-
cal damage and reducing the alkalinity, and therefore the 
value, of the subsurface brines by keeping them at a low tem-
perature. As its properties were wholly inaccessible until 
JUly, 1937, and partly so until September, 1937, plaintiff was 
unable to resume operations until October, 1937. Defendant 
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released altogether approximately 50,000 acre feet of water 
into the lake. There was evidence that it could have stored 
some of this water in Tinnemaha Reservoir for later release 
down the Santa Clara River or onto the, Mojave Desert, and 
could have spread the remainder in the Owens River :V~lley., 
On December 17, 1937, plaintiff brought suit for an lUJunc-
tion. On December 30, 1937, plaintiff's claim for damagea 
was received by the mailing clerk of the water department, 
and upon its rejection plaintiff filed its. action for. ~ama~es; 
These actions were consolidated for trIal. The lUJun~h.on 
was denied, and judgment was entered awarding plaintift 
$153,578.85. From this judgment defendant appeals. 
[1] It is generally recognized that one who makes sub-
stantial expenditures in reliance on long-continued diversion 
of water by another has the right to have the diversion con-, 
tinued if his investment would otherwise be destroyed. 
(Chowchilla Farms, Inc. v. Martin, 219 Cal. 1 [25 P.2d 435] ; 
Matheson v. Ward, 24 Wash. 407 [64 P. 520, 85 Am.St.Rep. 
955] ; Pere Marquette Ry. Co. v. Siegle, 260 Mich. 89 [244 
N.W. 239] j Mathewson v. Hoffman, 77 Mich. 420 [43 N.W. 
879, 6 L.R.A. 349] ; Kray v. Mtlggli, 84 Minn. 90 [86 N.W. 
882, 87 Am.St.Rep. 332, 54 L.R.A. 473]; Peter v. Oaswell, 
38 Ohio St. 518; Delaney v. Boston, 2 Har. (Del.) 489 j Shep-
ardson v. Perkins, 58 N.H. 354 j Hammond v. Antwerp Light 
& Power 00., 132 Misc. 786 [230 N.Y.S. 621, 634] j Ford v. 
Whitlock, 27 Vt. 265; Smith v. Youmans, 96 Wis. 103 [70 
N.W. 1115, 65 Am.St.Rep. 30, 37 L.R.A. 285].) Thus in the 
Chowchilla Farms case the court held, in recognition of the 
rights of those with lands riparian to' a changed . channel" 
that the flow could not be returned to its former bed. [2] It 
has also been held that the rights of those who improve land 
previously submerged would be infringed if the 18J!.d",ere 
submerged again. (Matheson v. Ward, supra; see cases col-
lected in 88 A.L.R. 142, et seq.; SanGabrierV.O. Club v. 
Los Angeles, 182 Cal. 392, 397 [188 P; ,554, 9 ~:L.R,: 1200]'.') 
A change in the flow of a stream that appears td ~e permll; 
nent usually leads to costly adjustments by'tli~e'interested; 
88 they come to regard the artificial conditi6nas. permane~t. 
It is therefore reasonable that they should receive as much 
protection 88 if the condition were natural. (See Ohowdh't'ZZa 
Farms, Inc. v. Martin, supra, and cases,there cited.), " 
Some jurisdictions do not afford this protection if the' di~ 
version can be continued olliy by maintaining a structure 
',; 
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such as a dam (Drainage Dist. v. Oity of Everett, 171 Wash. 
471 [18 P.2d 53, 88 A.L.R. 123]), apparently because it 
would be an excessive burden for one to maintain a dam that 
is of no further use to him. When the owner maintains the 
dam but alters the flow to increase his profit at the expense 
of those below him, or merely to be arbitrary, it is reason-
able to' require that the alterations shall not injure those who 
have relied on the customary operation of the dam in the 
past. (Kray v. MuggU, supra; Smith v. Youmans, supra; 
Pere Marquette Ry. 00. v. Siegle, supra; Hammond v. Ant-
werp Light & Power 00., supra; see Marshall Ice 00. v. La 
Plant, 136 Iowa 621, 633 [111 N.W. 1016, 12 L.R.A.N.S. 
1073] ; Greisinger v. Klinhardt, 321 Mo. 186 [9 S.W.2d 978] ; 
Mitchell Drainage Dist. v. Farmers Irrigation Dist., 127 Neb. 
484 [256 N.W. 15].) 
[3] In the present case defendant not only diverted the 
flow of the Owens River for many years, but augmented it 
by such activities as the dip.ging of wells and drainage ditches, 
so that the diversion appeared to be permanent. The gates 
in defendant's dam did not dispel the impression of perma. 
nence, for it was evident from the continued dryness of the 
lake that they were kept closed. Reliance on the permanence 
of the diversion was therefore natural; moreover, it was 
highly desirable, for it motivated the development of natural 
resources of substantial value. The findings, amply supported 
by the evidence, establish that defendant could easily have 
found an outlet for the surplus water instead of causing it 
to flow into the lake. While the flow of water was unusually 
large for a brief period, it would have been within the capa-
city of the aqueduct had it been stored temporarily in avail-
able space, and gradually released where it could do no harm. 
Defendant attempted to prove that it released the water with 
a high boron content to lower the boron content of the water 
flowing into the aqueduct. There was evidence, however, that 
the boron content of the water used by defendant had never 
been high and that it was not substantially lowered by re-
leasing the water. In any event, defendant could have re-
leased th? boron-bearing witter elsewhere. These findings 
are sufficlent to establish liability, and it is therefore un-
necessary to consider the additional finding that defenda.nt 
was negligent in failing to construct sufficient headwater 
storage. 
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[4] Defendant contends that since an appropriative right 
is limited by the needs of the appropriator (Cal. Const., art .. 
XIV, sec. 3; Civ. Code, sec. 1411), it was under ,an obliga-
tion to release the water that it did not need into the Owens 
River channel at Intake. These constitutional and statutory 
provisions, designed to insure a reasonable division of a lim-
ited water supply, have never been construed as requiring it 
particular disposition of surplus water, least of all a disposi; . 
tion harmful to the recipient. The constitutional mandate· 
forbidding "the waste or unreasonable use of Wate:.:'," far· 
from requiring, actually forbids a disPosition that wouldeu- . 
tail not only waste of water but damage to valuable natural 
resources. . . '. 
[5] Defendant also contends that as a riparian oWner ii. 
had the right to the full flow of the Owens River ~past its 
lands below Intake. Such a right, however, would clearly 
~xceed that allowed by the Constitution, which provides that 
"the right to water ... shall be limited to such w~ter as shall 
be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served ... tI 
(Cal. Const., art. XIV, sec. 3), for defendant makes no claim 
that it has any beneficial use for the water. 
[6] In addition to other items, plaintiff was awarded dam-
ages for loss of profits, which defendant contends was not 
proved with certa.inty. The award of damages for loss of 
profits depends upon whether there is a satisfactory basis for 
estimating what the probable earnings would have been had 
there been no tort. If no such basis exists, as in cases where 
the establishment of a business is prevented, it maybe neces-
sary to deny such recovery. (Oalifornia P. Mfg. Co., Inc~ 
v. Stafford Packing Co., 192 Cal. 479, 485 [221 P. 345, 32 
A.L.R. 114] ; Gibson v. Hercules Mfg. Co., Inc., 80 Cal.App. 
689 [252 P. 780].) If, however, there has been operating 
experience sufficient to permit a reasonable estimate of prob-
able income and expense, damages for loss of prospective 
profits are awarded. (Sobelman v. Maier, 203 Cal. 1, 9 
[262 P. 1087]; Pacific etc. 00. v. Alaska Packers Assn., 138 
Cal. 632 [72 P. 161] ; Landon v. Hill, 136 Cal.App. 560 [29 
P.2d 281] ; Pye v. Eagle Lake Lumber 00., 66 Cal.App. 584 
[227 P. 193] ; Hacker Pipe & S. 00. v. Ohapman V. Mfg. 00., 
17 Cal.App.2d 265 [61 P.2d 944].) In the present case plain-
tiff's probable gross receipts could be estimated:trom its sales 
in the preceding two years, in view of the evidence that prices 
. , 
I 
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were stable. Its unit costs could be estimated on the basis 
of detailed figures concerning actual expenses, such as labor 
depreciation, insurance, taxes, and royalties for the limited 
operations carried on in 1938. Its plant capacity was con-
servatively estimated at 90 tons per day, since plaintiff's old 
p.lant, using the "carbonating process" had a proved capa-
CIty of from 35 to 40 tons a day, and the capacity of the 
new "Mono Process" plant had been increased from 50 to 
100 tons a day. Awards of prospective profits have been 
sustained on the basis of much less satisfactory evidence. 
(See Pacific etc. 00. v. Alaska Packers Assn., supra; Shoe-
maker v. Acker, 116 Cal. 239 [48 P. 62] ; Hacker v. Ohapman 
Mfg. 00., supra; Landon v. Hill, supra; Story Parchment 
00. v. Paterson etc. 00., 282 U.S. 555 [51 S.Ct. 248, 75 L.Ed. 
5~4]; Barrett 00. v. Panther Rubber 00., 24 F.2d 329.) 
Smce defendant made it impossible for plaintiff to realize 
any profits, it cannot complain if the probable profits are of 
necessity estimated. (Sobelman v. Maier, supra, at p. 9; 
Schumann v. Karrer, 184 Cal. 50, 57 [192 P. 849] ; Meer v. 
Oerati, 53 Cal.App. 497 [200 P. 501].) , 
. [7] Defen~antrelies on the fact that in the years imme-
dIately precedmg the flooding plaintiff did not make a profit. 
A. comparable problem was presented in Buxbaum v. G. H. P. 
O~gar 00., 188 Wis. 389 [206 N.W. 59], where the defendant 
broke a contract giving the plaintiff a right to sell cigars 
of t~e defendant's manufacture. Although no profit had 
pre~7Jo.usly been recovered from the sale of the cigars, the 
plamtIff was able to show that its expenses in the year the 
co~tract was bro~en were low enough to have permitted a 
gam from sales m that year, and recovery of prospective 
pro~ts was allowed. In the present case plaintiff was engaged 
dUrI?-g ~he two years immediately preceding the tort in con-
~ertmg Its plant, and it maintained its sales position by sell-
mg soda products purchased elsewhere. The court might 
well have concluded that profits were probable, since the com-
~letion of alterations enabled plaintiff to sell products from 
Its own plant. 
[8] De.fendant contends that plaintiff's damages should 
be determmed o~ ~h~ basis of opinion evidence concerning 
the .valu~ of plamt~ff s properties before and after the tort. 
:VhIle thIS method IS the usual one for determining damages 
for trespass to real property, it yields to others if they are 
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more appropriate to a particular situation. (See McCorl 
mick, Damages, p. 482, et seq.; 15 Am. Jur. 514.) In' the; 
case of a reparable injury, a frequent measure of damages is' 
the cost of making repairs plus the value of the use of the 
premises for the period during which the tort has' deprived 
the owner of the property. (Linforth v. San Francisco Gas 
& Electric 00., 156 Cal. 58 [103 P. 320, 19 Ann. Cas. 1230]; 
Green v. General Petroleum Oorp., 205 Cal. 328 [270 P. 952, 
60 .A.L.R. 475] ; Higgins v. Los Angeles Gas & Electric 00., 
159 Cal. 651, 662 [115 P. 313, 34 L.R.A.N.S. 717]; Kell v. 
Jansen, 53 Cal.App.2d 498 [127 P.2d 1033].) Similarly, 
in the present case damages were given for the physical de-
struction resulting from the tort, and the valrte' of the use 
of plaintiff's properties was properly estimated on the basis, 
of the probable profits that would have been derived from 
their operation. Moreover, plaintiff's properties are a com. 
plex aggregation of real and personal property, 'of pumps, 
plant, pipe lines, and mineral rights. It is commonknowl-
edge that such plants do not frequently change hands, and 
that in a sale the price is likely to be based on considerations 
peculiar to the plant. Expert opinion as to the market value 
of such a plant is likely to be based on nothing more sub-
stantial than the probable returns from the operations of the 
plant. A more accurate assessment of damage can be ob-
tained by estimating loss of profits directly. (Inyo Ohem-
ical 00. v. Oity of Los A.ngeles, 5 Cal.2d 525 [55 P,2d 850] ; 
Teller v. Bay & River Dredging 00., 151 Cal. 209 [90 P. 942, 
12 Ann.Cas. 779, 12 L.R.A.N.S. 267]; Sacchi v. Bayside 
Lumber 00., 13 Cal.App. 72, 73, 84 [108 P. 885] ; see Weill, 
"Value of the Use" in Non-Renting Localities, 13 Cal.L.Rev; 
373.) . 
Defendant invokes section 363 of the Charter of Los An-
geles, providing that "Every claim and demand against the, 
city shall be first presented to and approved in writing by 
the board, officer or employee authorized by this charter to 
incur the expenditure or liability represented thereby," and 
section 376, providing that "No suit shall be brought on any 
claim for money or damages against the City of Los Angeles, 
or any officer or board of the city,until a demand for the 
same has been presented, as herein provided, and rejected 
in whole or in part. . . . Except in thoSe cases where a shorter 
period is otherwise provided by law, all claims for damages 
1 
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against the city must be presented within six (6) months 
after the occurrence from which the damages arose. . . ." 
Plaintiff presented his claim by mailing a copy of it to the 
Department of Water and Power. Upon receiving it the 
mailing clerk of the department gave it to the chief clerk of 
the legal division, who forwarded it to the deputy cit~ at-
torney in charge of water matters, and the latter sent It to 
the board of water commissioners, advising its rejection. 
[9] It is settled that the board of water commissioners is 
"the board ... authorized by this charter to incur the ex-
penditure" here involved. (Douglass v. Oity of Los Angeles~ 
5 Cal.2d 123, 134 [53 P.2d 353] ; Oontinental Ins. Co. v. Oity 
of Los Angeles, 92 Cal.App. 585 [268 P. 920] ; see Huey v. 
Oity of Los Angeles, 137 Cal.App. 48 [29 P.2d 918].) [10] It 
is likewise settled that the requirement that a claim be pre· 
sented·to such a board is satisfied by presentation to a subor-
dinate who represents the board for the receipt of such claims 
from the pUblic. (Douglass v. Oity of Los Angeles,supra; 
McOandless v. Oity of Los Angeles, 10 Cal.App.2d 407 [52 
P.2d 545] ; Sandstoe v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 28 Cal. 
App.2d 215 [82 P.2d 216].) [11] It is the function of the 
board to supervise the water department, which operates the 
waterworks of Los Angeles and controls the water revenue 
fund (Los Angeles Charter, sec. 71; 220(1)(7», and the 
members of the department are therefore the subordinates 
of the board and may represent it in receiving claims. (Mc-
Candless v. City of Los Angeles, supra; see Douglass v. Oity 
of Los Angeles, supra, at p. 134.) [12] A claim may be pre-
sented by registered mail, as in the present case (see Metcalf 
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 00., 1 Cal.App.2d 481 [37 P.2d 
115] ), and the mailing clerk of the water department is the 
subordinate charged with receiving claims so presented. The 
fact that the claim passed through many hands before it was 
actually considered by the board of water commissioners sig-
nifies merely that the board wished to be advised of the merits 
of claims before considering them. Plaintiff's claim was 
therefore filed with the appropriate officer. 
[13] The question remains whether it was filed "within 
six months after the occurrence from which the damage 
arose." Beginning on February 6th, defendant opened the 
gates in its dam intermi~tently until the last day of June. 
The water reached its peak in May, and did not entirely dis-
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appear until some time in September. The claim was filed 
on December 30th. . 
The principal purpose of the requirement ~hat claims. be 
filed is to provide the city with full informatIOn concerrun.g 
rights asserted against it, so that it may set~le those of ~erit 
without litigation. (Western Salt 00. v. O~ty of San D~ego, 
181 Cal. 696, 699 [186 P. 345] ; Sandstoe v. Atchison T.& 
S. F. Ry. 00., 28 Cal.App.2d 215, 223 [82 P.2d ,216] ; see .18 
Cal.Jur. 1109.) That purpose is best served If the entire 
sequence of events giving rise to the injury is regarded as 
the "occurrence from which the damage arose," for damages 
can be assessed accurately only when. the sequenee is cO,mi, 
pleted and the total injury taken i:nto' account. 'T~~s, in the 
present case the injuries continued to, acc,~!?ulaie,but were; 
not entirely apparent so long as water ,remamed ,on . th~! lak6; 
bed. (See Haigh v. City of Los Angeles, 139 Cal~App. 595, 
[34 P.2d 779].) .... ,;, ,'" , 
Defendant contends that the case of rowers, Farms v., 
Oonsolidated Irrigation District, 19Ca1.2d 123' [119P.2d 
717], requires II different construction of the charter provi-
sion. That case, however, involved a 'different statute, an~ 
since no claim had been filed the court was concerned with: 
determining, not the time within which a claim had to be 
filed, but whether the presentation of any cla1m.was.~equired.: 
To hold that plaintiff was required topresElD:ta .,clli.,~~ for the 
entire damage to its property by Septeniber~th, SIX. months. 
after the initial flooding established the inevitability of dam7; 
ages, would require an unreasonable. cOl:1.I3truction of, the, l~n,~~ 
guage of the charter provision, for the last flooding; C?ontrlb~f 
uted to the injury as well as the first, and it :would theJ,"ef~t:~, 
be inaccurate to say that the first flooding was ."the occlfr- .' 
rence from which the damage arose. ". Moreover, the lake ~as 
stilI partially inundated on September 6th, and sorneo! the 
damage was yet to occur. Since plaintiff's plant was wholly 
inaccessible until July, and partly . so until Septe~ber, plain- \ 
tiff would have had only a brief interval hi which to ascer-
tain and evaluate the damage and could hardly have pre-
pared a claim by September 6th, in' compliance with the 
charter provision that "No demand can be approved ... 
unless it specify each several item, with the date and amount 
thereof." (Los Angeles Charter, sec. 368.) Hence, if plain. 
tiff were required to present a claim by that date, the charter 
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would have the effect of denying plaintiff the right to recover 
for much of the injury to his property. The state Constitu-
tion, however, provides for the right to compensation for 
the damaging of property for the public use (Cal. Const., 
art. I, sec. 14). [14] A municipality can prescribe reason-
able procedures for the enforcement of this right (Crescent 
Wharf etc. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 207 Cal. 430 [278 P. 
1028]), but cannot enact legislation that would operate to 
prevent or unduly hamper the enforcement of such a right. 
(Douglass v. City of Los Angeles, 5 Cal.2d 123, 128 [53 P.2d 
353]; Geimann v. Board of Police Commrs., 158 Cal. 748 
[112 P. 553]; see Rafferty v. City of Marysville, 207 Cal. 
657, 665 [280 P. 118]; see 5 Cal.Jur. 780; 34 Am.Jur. 32.) 
The same considerations apply to defendant's contention that 
plaintiff was required to file its claim within six months from 
the day in May that the water reached its peak. Additional 
water was released after that day augmenting the injury. 
[15] Defendant contends that plaintiff's rights are barred 
on the ground that it failed to comply with the statute pro-
viding that "whenever it is claimed that any person has 
been injured or any property damaged as a result of the dan-
ge~01~s or defective condition of any public street, highway, 
bUIldmg, park, grounds, works or property, a verified claim 
... shall be presented ... with the clerk ... of the legislative 
body of the municipality . . . within ninety days after such 
accident has occurred." (Stats. 1931, p. 2475, Deering's Gen. 
Laws, 1937, Act 5149.) This statute is inapplicable, however, 
for the damage in the present case arose, not from the danger-
ous condition of any public property, but from defendant's 
acts. (Ogando v. Carquinez G. School Dist., 24 Cal.App.2d 
567 [75 P.2d 641] ; Jackson v. City of Santa Monica, 13 Cal. 
App.2d 376 [57 P.2d 226].) 
[16] Defendant invokes as statutes of limitation sections 
315, 316, 320, 338(2), 339(1), and 343 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. Sections 315 and 316 relate to the acquisition of 
title by adverse possession, but defendant has submitted no 
evidence that it has acquired such title. Section 320 relates 
to certain rights under Mexican Land Grants (see the note 
by t~e ~ode ~ommissioners in .Code Civ. Proc. 1872, sec. 320) 
a~d ~s mapph~able here. Plamtiff's action was brought well 
WIthIn the perIOd prescribed by the other sections. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
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Gibson, C. J., CurtIS, J., Carter, J:, and Schauer, J., con-
curred. 
SHENK, J.-I dissent. The prevailing opinion holds that 
the requirement that a claim be presented within six months 
"after the occurrence from which the damages arose" is. met 
when the claim is presented within six months after the last 
of a series of occurrences which caused the damage, and, pre-
sumably, that recovery may be had for the enti:re damage 
including the damage arising from acts occurring more than 
six months prior to the presentation of the claim. .1 agree 
that a claim may properly be presented within six months 
from the last occurrence giving rise to damage, but I do not 
agree with the holding that recovery may be had for damage 
arising from occurrences which happened prior to the begin-
ning of the six months' period. . 
The purpose of the requirement for filing claims is not only 
to provide the municipality with information so that it may 
settle claims without litigation. Another very important 
purpose, in a case of continuing damage, such as the present 
one, is to give the city an opportunity to provide protection 
against damage by the continued acts complained of, should 
it deem itself liable. Therefore the rule stated in Powers 
Farms v. Consolidated Irr. Dist., 19 Cal.2d 123, 129 [119 P. 
2d 717], that "where the time and extent of injury are un-
certain, a statutory period of limitations begins to run when 
the fact that damage is occurring becomes apparent and dis-
coverable, even though the extent of the damage may still 
be unknown," has a sound basis in reason and justice. If, 
as was apparent in the present case, a continuation of the 
acts would result in a loss to the plaintiff, either total or par-
tial, both reason and justice required that the municipality 
be apprised of the first occurrence causing damage at least 
within the time required by law, rather than that the plain-
tiff be permitted to remain silent until the damage mounted 
to a total loss. To hold the plaintiff thus to the requirement 
is not at all to effect a disregard of the language of the charter 
provision. On the contrary, it is a compliance with the plain 
terms thereof. It does not follow that to require compliance 
would be to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right to 
compensation for damaging private property for public use. 
It is settled that although the constitutional provision is self-
; I 
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executing, the legislature may properly set up a procedure 
for the recovery of the damages, and that the filing of a claim 
within a specified period of limitations is a proper step in 
such procedure. "Although the Constitution grants the 
right to compensation, it does not specify the procedure by 
which the right may be enforced. Such procedure may be 
set up by statutory or charter provisions, and when so es-
tablished, a failure to comply with it is deemed to be a waiver 
of the right to compel the payment of damages." (Powers 
Farms v. Oonsolidated Irr. Dist., supra, 19 Cal.2d 123, 126 
[119 P.2d 717] ; Davis v. East Oontra Oosta Irrigation Dist., 
19 Ca1.2d 140 [119 P.2d 727]; Rose v. State of Oalifornia, 
19 Ca1.2d 713, 725 [123 P.2d 505] ; Orescent Wharf & Ware-
house 00. v. Los Angeles, 207 Cal. 430 [278 P. 1028]; Los 
Angeles Athletic Olub v. Long Beach, 128 Cal.App. 427 [17 
P.2d 1061].) 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied Decem-
ber 2. 1943. Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., voted for a re-
hearing. 
[Crim. No. 4499. In Bank. Nov. 18, 1943.J 
In re CARLOS HERRERA et aI., on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Delinquent Children and Youths-Youth Correction-Consti-
tutionality of Statute-Delegation of Legislative or Judicial 
Power.-The provisions of the Youth Correction Authority 
Act (Welf. & lnst. Code, §§ 1766, 1768-1771) vesting power 
in the Authority to determine, within the limits prescribed 
how long convicted persons shall be detained and how the; 
shall be treated after commitment, are not an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative or judicial power. 
[2] Constitutional Law - Class Legislation - Legislative Discre-
tion: Presumptions.-The authority and duty to ascertain 
facts which will justify classified legislation rests with the 
Legislature in the first instance, whose decision is ordinarily 
conclusive on the courts. Every presumption is in favor of 
the validity of the legislative act, and legislative classifica-
[2] See 5 Cal.Jur. 826, 832; 12 Am.Jur. 140. 
McK. Dig. References.: [1, 3, 4, 6-8J Delinquent Children, § 31' 
[2J Constitutional Law, §§ 150,163; [5J Infants, § 1. ' 
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[3J 
[4] 
[6] 
[6] 
[7] 
[8] 
tion will not be disturbed unless it is palpably arbitrary and 
neither founded on nor supported by reason. 
Delinquent Children and Youths-Youth Correction-Consti-
tutionality of Statute-Discretionary Power in Acceptance of 
Cases.-The provision of the Youth Correction Authority Act 
(Welf. & lnst. Code, § 1731.5, as amended by Stats. 1943, ch. 
236), vesting in the Authority, up to January 1, 1946, a dis-
cretionary power in the acceptance Of cases, is not unconstitu-
tional as being discriminatory and arbitrary, since without 
such a provision the effectiveness of the Authority would have 
been imperiled for lack of time to coordinate the necessary 
facilities for the treatment of those committed to it. 
Id.-Youth Correction-Constitutionality of Statutee-Age of 
Persons Committed.-The provision of the Youth Correction 
Authority Act (Welf. & lnst. Code, §§ 1731.5, 1732) that any 
offender who is less than 23 years of age at the time he is 
apprehended may be committed to the Authority, ,is based on 
a reasonable classification, as it reaches the offender during 
his formative years. ' 
Infants-Period of MinoritY.-The age of majority is a matter 
of legislative regulation, and the Legislature may prescribe a 
longer period of minority for some purposes than for others. 
Delinquent Children and Youths-Youth Correction-Consti-
tutionality of Statute-Exclusion of Perso'nsGullty ,of Grave 
Offenses.-The provision of the Youth Correction Authority 
Act (Welf. & lnst. Code, §§ 1731.5, 1732), excluding from the 
classification of those eligible for commitnient, to the Author-
ity persons who are sentenced to death 'or ilife imprisonment, 
is not improper discriniination, even though such excluded:per- " 
sons meet the age requirement. ", •. " ",~, : ,f, .::~., J);. 
Id.-'-Youth Correction-Constitutionality: of· Statutei!-~a.sbi-::~. 
ableness of Classification-Length of: Detention;"':':The rY'Ciuth,' , 
Correction Authority Act (Welf.&Inst.' Code, §'i765,etiseq">':,i 
is not unreasonably discriminatory because: a;,personcom:mit~':" 
ted to the Authority may remain in its ,custody, ,for :,a P'llrjod. • 
longer than the period of imprisonment ,that may" be pr~ .. 
scribed for a person convicted of the same ofi'ense,but. not' 
committed to the Authority. " 
Id.-Youth Correction-Commitmen1;--:-Suftlciency ,as Judg-
ment.-A commitment signed by a superior court judge certi- ' 
[5] See 14 Cal.Jur. 113; 27 Am.Jur. 747. 
[8] Sufficiency of judgment in criminal case, note, 69 A.L.R. 
792. See, also, 8 Cal.Jur. 465; 15 Am.Jur; 105. 
